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Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crises of the 1970s  
and the Cold War 
David S. Painter ∗ 
Abstract: »Öl und Geopolitik. Die Ölkrisen der 1970er Jahre und der Kalte 
Krieg«. Examination of the geopolitics of oil in the 1970s provides important 
insights into the nature and dynamics of the Cold War. Possession of ample 
domestic oil supplies and the ability to ensure access to foreign oil reserves 
were significant elements in the power position of the United States in its Cold 
War competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. oil production peaked in 1970, 
however, making the United States increasingly dependent on oil imports and 
ending its ability to provide oil to its allies during supply interruptions. At the 
same time, economic nationalism and war and revolution in the Middle East led 
to disruptions in supply and sharp increases in oil prices in 1973-74 and again 
in 1978-80. In contrast, the Soviet Union overtook the United States as the 
world’s leading oil producer in the 1970s, and the windfall from higher oil pric-
es helped support Soviet military and economic power and involvement in the 
Third World. The oil crises raised questions about the ability of the United 
States to ensure access to Middle East oil, heightened concerns about the dan-
gers of Western dependence on Third World resources, and fed fears that the 
Soviet Union was winning the Cold War. Although the oil crises of 1970s ini-
tially harmed the United States and its allies and contributed to the demise of 
détente, they also set in motion changes that led to the end of the Cold War. 
Keywords: Oil crisis, Cold War, Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, Brzezinski, 1970s, détente. 
1.  Introduction1 
Although Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that the energy crisis “altered 
irrevocably the world as it has grown up in the postwar period,” neither his 
memoirs nor most studies of the 1970s examine the interaction of the decade’s 
oil crises and the course of the Cold War.2 Oil is mentioned only twice in the 
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1,180 pages of Raymond Garthoff’s Détente and Confrontation, and there is 
surprisingly little in Odd Arne Westad’s Global Cold War, despite its focus on 
the Cold War in the Third World in the 1970s. Recent edited works on Nixon’s 
foreign policy and the “global” 1970s lack essays on the oil crises, as do vol-
umes 2 and 3 of the Cambridge History of the Cold War, which overlap the 
decade.3 Similarly, most studies of the oil crises of the 1970s do not take the 
larger geopolitical context into account. Neither Daniel Yergin’s magisterial 
survey, The Prize, nor such fine works on the oil crises as Raymond Vernon’s 
classic edited volume, Steven A. Schneider’s detailed study, or Fiona Venn’s 
overview place the crises within the context of the Cold War.4 
Examination of the geopolitics of oil shows the interaction between the stra-
tegic and economic benefits of controlling world oil and the oil crises of the 
1970s. Although they did not result directly from the confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, the oil crises had a significant impact on 
the Cold War. Coinciding with U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Watergate 
crisis, a wave of revolutions in the Third World, the Soviet Union’s achieve-
ment of nuclear parity with the United States, and the decline of U.S. manufac-
turing as a result of increased competition from Western Europe and Japan, the 
oil crises reinforced perceptions of a weakened United States, raised questions 
about its leadership of the Western alliance, heightened concerns about the 
dangers of Western dependence on Third World resources, and led to fears that 
the Soviet Union was winning the Cold War.  
2.  Oil and the American Century 
Possession of ample domestic oil supplies and control over access to foreign oil 
reserves have been significant, if often overlooked, elements in the power 
position of the United States.5 One of the key features of the geopolitics of oil 
in the twentieth century was that, with two exceptions – the United States and 
the Soviet Union – none of the great powers possessed significant oil reserves 
within their borders. The United States was the world’s leading oil producer for 
the first three-quarters of the century. U.S. oil fields accounted for slightly less 
than two-thirds of world oil production in 1920, slightly more than two-thirds 
in 1945, and 16.5 percent in 1973.6 In addition to a thriving domestic oil indus-
try, five of the seven great oil corporations (the so-called Seven Sisters) that 
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4  Yergin 1991; Vernon 1976; Schneider 1983; Venn 2002. 
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dominated the international oil industry from the 1920s to the 1970s were 
American companies.7 U.S. oil companies, along with British firms, dominated 
the oil industries of the two main producing countries in Latin America – Mex-
ico (until 1938) and Venezuela – and had smaller holdings throughout the 
region. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the U.S. government successfully 
supported efforts by U.S. oil companies to gain oil concessions in the Middle 
East. U.S. companies were also involved in regionally significant oil fields in 
the Netherlands East Indies.8  
Control of oil played a vital role in establishing and maintaining U.S. 
preeminence in the international system. Oil-powered platforms emerged dur-
ing World War I, became central to military power during World War II, and 
remained important in the postwar era despite the development of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. Although nuclear-powered warships (mainly 
aircraft carriers and submarines) were developed in the 1950s, most of the 
world’s warships still relied on oil, as did aircraft, armor, and mechanized 
transport, and each new generation of weapons required more oil than its pre-
decessors used. In addition, the U.S. military established a vast archipelago of 
overseas bases that allowed it to project its power into almost every region of 
the world. The forces that carried out this strategy were oil-fueled and could 
also be used to maintain access to overseas oil reserves.9 
In addition to being essential to military power, oil played an increasingly 
important role in the economies of the industrial countries. Oil became the fuel 
of choice in land and sea transport as well as the only fuel for air transport, 
challenged coal as the main source of energy for industry, and played an im-
portant role in heating and electricity generation. Oil-powered machinery be-
came crucial to modern agriculture, and oil and natural gas became important 
feedstocks for fertilizers and pesticides. Already almost one-fifth of U.S. ener-
gy consumption by 1925, oil accounted for around one-third of U.S. energy use 
by World War II. Outside the United States, oil was reserved mainly for the 
military and accounted for around 10 percent of energy consumption in West-
ern Europe and Japan before World War II.10 
Following World War II, U.S. leaders saw economic growth in Western Eu-
rope and Japan as vital to the containment of Soviet power and influence. War-
time destruction, dislocation, and overuse drastically reduced coal production 
                                                             
7  Known as the “Seven Sisters” because of their close ties and multiple joint ventures, they 
included Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Socony (Mobil), Standard Oil of California 
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pany (after 1954 British Petroleum), and the Royal Dutch/Shell group, a 60 percent Dutch 
and 40 percent British partnership. See Sampson 1975; Penrose 1968. 
8  Painter 1986, 3-10; Randall 2005, 13-109. 
9  McNeill and Painter 2009, 20-4. 
10  McNeill 2000, 297-331; Podobnik 2006; Schneider, 1983, 520-2. 
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in Western Europe.11 To fuel economic recovery in this vital region, the United 
States sought to ensure that it received the energy it needed, in part by provid-
ing dollars through the Marshall Plan to enable Western European countries to 
buy oil from U.S. companies. Economic growth, in turn, was crucial to mitigat-
ing the class conflicts that had divided European and Japanese society in the first 
half of the century. Economic growth and prosperity undercut the appeal of Left-
ist parties, financed the welfare state, perpetuated the ascendancy of centrist 
elites, and sustained the cohesion of the Western alliance. In addition, controlling 
access to oil helped the United States reconcile its aim of German and Japanese 
economic recovery and integration into a Western alliance with that of preventing 
German and Japanese revanchism. To maintain access to oil in the Middle East, 
Latin America, and elsewhere in the Third World the United States and its allies 
sought to contain Soviet influence and opposed economic nationalism.12 
Although oil was also an important element in Soviet power, the Soviet Un-
ion was unable to convert its control of significant oil supplies into influence in 
international affairs outside of Eastern Europe. The Russian Empire was a lead-
ing oil producer in 1900, but almost two decades of war and revolution decimated 
its output. Under Soviet control, the oil industry recovered, and by 1941 the 
Soviet Union was the world’s second largest producer, far behind the United 
States and slightly ahead of Venezuela. Over-production, competing demands for 
manpower and materials, and wartime damage reduced Soviet output, and the 
Soviet Union was a net importer of oil and refined products, mostly from Roma-
nia and Austria, until the mid-1950s. During the 1950s, the Soviets increased 
production from the Volga-Urals region, and by 1960 the Soviet Union was once 
again the second leading oil producer and had resumed large-scale oil exports.13 
3.  The First Oil Shock  
Oil’s economic importance increased after World War II as the United States 
intensified its embrace of patterns of socioeconomic organization premised on 
high levels of oil use, and Western Europe and Japan made the transition from 
coal to oil as their main source of energy. Between 1950 and 1972, total world 
energy consumption increased 179 percent, much faster than population growth, 
resulting in a doubling of per capita energy consumption. Oil accounted for much 
of this increase, rising from 29 percent of world energy consumption in 1950 to 
46 percent in 1972. By 1972, oil accounted for 45.6 percent of U.S. energy 
consumption. Western Europe and Japan were even more dependent on oil, 
nearly all of which was imported, to meet their energy needs. By 1972 oil ac-
                                                             
11  Leffler 2005; Kapstein 1990, 17-46. 
12  Painter 2009; Painter 2010. 
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counted for 59.6 percent of west European energy consumption and 73 percent of 
Japanese energy consumption. The Soviet Union moved more slowly, but by 
1973, oil supplied around 39 percent of Soviet energy consumption.14 
The sharp rise in U.S. oil consumption combined with quotas limiting U.S. 
oil imports put a strain on U.S. oil supplies. U.S. oil reserves peaked in 1968 
and oil production in 1970, and U.S. oil imports rose from 19 percent of total 
demand in 1970 to 35 percent in 1973. The disappearance of spare productive 
capacity meant that the United States could no longer provide oil to its allies 
during supply interruptions, ending what had been an important element under-
pinning U.S. influence in international affairs. At the same time the center of 
gravity of world oil production shifted from the Western Hemisphere to the 
Middle East; the region’s share of world oil production rose from 7 percent in 
1950 to around 42 percent in 1973, as oil companies concentrated their invest-
ments there to take advantage of low production costs.15  
In this environment, oil prices were already rising when the Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), ten days after the onset of the 
October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, decided to cut back oil production in order to 
force the Europeans and Japan to put pressure on the United States to change 
its policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute. A few days later, in response to signifi-
cant U.S. financial and military assistance to Israel, OAPEC imposed an em-
bargo on oil shipments to the United States. OAPEC also placed an embargo on 
oil shipments to the Netherlands for its military assistance to Israel, and later 
extended the embargo to Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia. The interna-
tional oil companies complied with the embargo, but undercut it by shifting 
non-Arab oil to the embargoed countries and distributing the cutbacks so that 
both embargoed and non-embargoed countries had their oil imports cut by 16-
18 percent. In an already tight oil market, the production cutbacks and embargo 
drove oil prices upwards. The Persian Gulf producers unilaterally raised the 
price of oil from $3.01 to $5.11 a barrel shortly after the war began, and in 
December, they raised prices again to $11.65 (in nominal dollars).16 
The embargo was not an “OPEC Embargo,” as it is often called in both 
scholarly studies and popular accounts. OAPEC, which in 1973 was composed 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt, and Syria, initiated the embargo and production cuts. Alt-
hough a member of OAPEC, Iraq went its own way, joining in the embargo, 
but not the production cuts. Non-Arab OPEC members, including Iran, Vene-
zuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, did not join the embargo or cut back production 
                                                             
14  Darmstadter and Landsberg 1976, 16-22; Schneider 1983, 49-75, 520-22; Goldman 1980, 52-4. 
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and exports. They were content to profit from the price increases and even 
boosted production. Indeed, the shah was a leading proponent of higher prices. 
Labeling the embargo an OPEC embargo obscures the specific political cir-
cumstances that led to it and conflates the embargo with the pressure OPEC 
had been putting on prices since 1971.17 
During the embargo Kissinger, who in September had become Secretary of 
State as well as national security advisor, and Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger made public threats of military intervention. Schlesinger also 
raised the issue with the British Ambassador and with NATO officials, and 
both Kissinger and Schlesinger brought up the possibility in many meetings.18 
Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that “these were not empty threats,” and that 
contingency plans were prepared. Schlesinger later told interviewers that the 
United States planned to make use of already scheduled military exercises in 
the Persian Gulf as a cover for intervention in Abu Dhabi, which he believed 
would intimidate the other producers.19 
The British government took Schlesinger’s statements seriously and com-
missioned a study on the impact of the United States using force against Arab 
oil producers. The study concluded that if the United States intervened before 
exhausting all possibilities of a peaceful settlement, the consequences for Eu-
rope would be “disastrous.” While Schlesinger apparently thought that seizing 
Abu Dhabi would suffice, the British study concluded that for military inter-
vention to be successful, all the fields in the region, including those in Saudi 
Arabia, would have to be seized. This would be a huge task that would take 
some time, increasing the likelihood of sabotage of the oil fields and related 
infrastructure.20 
Rather than reflecting actual plans to intervene, the threats were probably in-
tended to intimidate the Saudis and other Gulf producers.21 The Saudis and 
Kuwaitis made it clear that, if attacked, they would destroy their oil facilities, 
                                                             
17  Lenczowski 1976, 60-7; on OAPEC, see Tétreault 1981; Cooper 2011, 143-8.  
18  Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1969-76, 36, docs. 229, 244, 247, 
251, 253, 255; Discussion between the Defence Secretary and the US Secretary of Defense, 7 
November 1973, Cromer to Douglas-Home, 15 November 1973, both in United Kingdom, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 3, Vol. 4: 
The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-1974 (ProQuest, 2014); Minis-
try of Defence to the Prime Minister, “Middle East,” 28 November 1973, PREM 15/1768; “Note 
by the Assessments Staff, Middle East: Possible Use of Force by the United States,” 12 December 
1973, PREM 15/1768, both in United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA). 
19  Kissinger 1982, 880; Cooper 2011, 129-30; Robinson 1988, 100-2. On the exercises, see 
FRUS 1969-76, 27, docs. 42, 46. 
20  “Note by the Assessments Staff, Middle East: Possible Use of Force by the United States,” 12 
Dec. 1973, PREM 15/1768; Hunt to the Prime Minister, “Middle East,” 3 Jan. 1974, PREM 
115/2153, both in UKNA. A study by the Congressional Research in summer 1975 came to 
similar conclusions; Congressional Research Service 1975. 
21  On the communicative aspects of the embargo, see the astute analysis by Graf 2012. 
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thus denying the West access to their oil for many years, and, U.S. assessments 
concluded that military action would almost certainly result in destruction of 
the oil facilities they were trying to control. In addition, most European coun-
tries opposed the use of force except as the last resort. Moreover, the Soviets 
would most likely have opposed U.S. intervention, possibly by providing assis-
tance to allies such as Iraq. Finally, the American public, in the wake of Vi-
etnam, probably would not have supported U.S. military intervention in the 
absence of a clear threat to U.S. security.22  
The United States also sought to use the oil crisis as way to reassert its lead-
ership of the Western alliance. A June 1973 NSC paper had pointed out that 
U.S. leverage in energy matters resulted from its economic and political influ-
ence with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two leading oil exporters; the U.S. techno-
logical lead in most fields of energy-related technology; and from the fact that 
the United States was the only major Western consumer nation with significant 
domestic oil resources. Similarly, NSC studies in August and early October 
called for the United States to capitalize on energy-related issues.23 During the 
crisis, the State Department Policy Planning Staff pointed out that the United 
States, as the only major Western country that could not be shut down by an oil 
embargo, had an opportunity to “revitalize” its alliances. What “revitalize” 
meant is clear in a NSC memorandum in early December 1973, which noted: 
“the unique role of the U.S. in the current oil crisis and in the longer term oil 
situation gives us some leverage with the Europeans. We have the power to 
make their oil situation better or worse.”24  
To put pressure on the Arab states, Kissinger urged the main oil consuming 
nations to coordinate their policies. In a speech in London on 12 December, he 
called for the creation of an international Energy Action Group (EAG) com-
posed of producers and consumers to explore ways to increase production and 
use energy more efficiently. Concerned that such an organization would antag-
onize the producers, the Europeans were reluctant to agree to the U.S. plan. In 
addition, the Europeans correctly suspected that Kissinger wanted to use the oil 
crisis as a means of re-asserting U.S. leadership of the Western alliance.25  
                                                             
22 ‘Saudi Arabia Warns U.S.’ 1973, 1; FRUS 1969-76, 36, doc. 255, note 2, cites a 10 January 
1974 CIA review of possible military contingencies which concluded that military interven-
tion to gain control of the oil fields would be counterproductive because it would probably 
result in “destroying the very objective we seek.” Kissinger and Schlesinger continued to 
make veiled threats of intervention after the end of the embargo, and there were a number 
of articles by conservative pundits calling for the United States to occupy Arabian oil fields. 
See Congressional Research Service 1975; Buheiry 1980. See also Herbestreuth 2012. 
23  FRUS 1969-76, 36, docs. 187, 193, 208. 
24  FRUS 1969-76, 36, docs. 256, 261, 262. 
25  FRUS 1969-76, 36: 762-64, 718-19, 731-35; Kissinger 1982, 896-7; Skeet 1988, 107; Gfeller 
2012, 120-2. 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  193 
Convinced that the Europeans and Japan were weakening the consumers’ 
position by seeking bilateral deals with Middle East, President Nixon on 9 Janu-
ary 1974 invited the major industrial nations to participate in an energy confer-
ence in Washington. The public U.S. position was that the conference of con-
sumers was not aimed at OPEC, and Nixon proposed that all OPEC members 
should meet with the consumer nations 90 days after the consumer conference. 
The clear purpose of the conference, however, was to develop a consumer group 
to improve the position of bargaining position of the oil consuming countries.26  
The main consumer countries met in Washington from 11 to 13 February. 
Most European nations, including the United Kingdom, desired a more inde-
pendent role for Europe, but also were reluctant to follow the French in openly 
opposing U.S. policies. Unable to promote alliance cohesion by providing oil to 
its allies, the United States resorted to threats and warnings to try to gain coop-
eration. In his toast at the beginning of the conference, Nixon suggested that 
failure of Europe and Japan to follow U.S. leadership on energy matters en-
couraged isolationism in the United States. Similarly, Kissinger warned that 
failure to solve the energy problem cooperatively “would threaten the world 
with a vicious cycle of competition, autarky, rivalry, and depression such as led 
to the collapse of world order in the 1930s.”27 
Most European countries, including the United Kingdom, recognized what 
the United States was doing. In addition, most viewed the production cutbacks 
and embargo as the result of U.S. policies. Nevertheless, most also understood 
the benefits of cooperation with the United States and, with the significant 
exception of France, went along with U.S. plans to establish a consumer group 
to balance the power of the producers. The French government later changed 
course, and acquiesced in the formation of the International Energy Agency 
within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment in November 1974.28 
In March, OAPEC decided to end the embargo after the United States 
helped negotiate ceasefire agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria. 
Saudi willingness to end the embargo was probably also influenced by agree-
ments with the United States to strengthen military and economic ties. In addi-
tion to providing military equipment, training, and technical assistance, the 
United States recommitted itself to protecting the Saudi regime against its 
internal as well as its external enemies.29 Most Arab states agreed to end the 
                                                             
26  FRUS 1969-76, 36: docs. 280, 293, 299, 314. 
27  FRUS 1969-76, 36, doc. 318; Kissinger 1982, 905-25; Kapstein 1990, 171-5; see also Hen-
ning Türk’s contribution in this HSR Special Issue. 
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29  Lenczowski 1976, 67; Telecon, President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger, 11 Mar. 1974, Digital 
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2011, 157-8; Safran 1985, 173-4; Schneider 1983, 242-3. Israel and Syria signed a ceasefire 
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embargo on 18 March. The same day the Saudis announced that they would 
immediately increase oil production by one million barrels a day. Libya, how-
ever, did not end its embargo until July.  
4.  The Economic Impact 
Higher oil prices intensified the economic problems faced by the United States 
and the other Western industrial countries in the 1970s, especially inflation, 
which was now accompanied by stagnation and unemployment. The cost of 
importing large amounts of more expensive oil also harmed the balance of 
payments of the United States and other importing countries.30  
Non-oil-producing developing countries were especially hit hard as they had 
to pay higher prices for products from the developed countries as well as for oil 
at the same time as demand for their exports dropped due to the global econom-
ic downturn. Many of these countries borrowed large sums from Western banks 
to cover their costs. Flush with petrodollars from the oil exporting countries, 
the banks were eager to lend and offered low interest rates. Many countries 
borrowed more than they could afford, a move that contributed to the Third 
World debt crisis of the 1980s when the United States raised interest rates in 
late 1979.31 
In contrast, higher oil prices produced windfall earnings for the Soviet Un-
ion. Between 1960 and 1973, Soviet oil production had almost tripled. As 
production in Volga-Urals region plateaued, rich fields were found in the West 
Siberian Basin, making Soviet oil reserves the largest in the world outside the 
Persian Gulf. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union overtook the United States as 
the world’s leading oil producer.32 In addition to exporting oil to Western coun-
tries, the Soviets supplied oil to Cuba and Vietnam at subsidized prices, and 
sent oil as economic assistance to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicara-
gua, and South Yemen. During the 1970s, the Soviets increased oil exports to 
hard currency markets. While the percentage of exports that went to the West 
varied from year to year, Soviet hard-currency earnings from oil exports dou-
bled in 1973 and again in 1974 and continued to increase for the rest of the 
decade. By 1976, oil exports were responsible for half of the Soviet Union’s 
hard currency earnings.33 
                                                             
30  Venn 2002, chaps. 4-5.  
31  Venn 2002, chap. 6.  
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The Soviets also benefited indirectly. Exports to developing countries of 
arms, military equipment, and dual-use civilian goods grew after the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War as the rise in the revenues of oil exporters increased their 
purchasing power. Before 1973, Soviet arms transfers were mainly to newly 
emerging leftist regimes and national liberation movements. After 1973, more 
than half of Soviet arms deliveries went to Middle Eastern states with access to 
oil money. Most of these sales were for hard currencies or barter arrangements 
in which the Soviets received oil that they re-exported for hard currency. Be-
tween 1974 and 1984, the Soviets received around $19 billion in hard currency 
from arms sales, and earned around $23 billion on bilateral or soft currency 
arms sales.34 
Higher earnings from oil exports allowed the Soviets to continue importing 
large amounts of grain and food to cover poor harvests and to import Western 
technology. Some of this technology probably enhanced Soviet military capa-
bilities by being utilized in new weapons platforms and improving existing 
ones. Higher oil revenues may also have made it possible for the Soviets to 
increase their involvement in the Third World in the 1970s. 
Increased involvement in the Third World brought the Soviets few long-
term gains, however, and proved costly both in terms of resources and in the 
negative impact on détente. Moreover, the cost of developing Siberian oil, 
including the necessary transportation infrastructure, drained scarce capital 
from other sectors of the Soviet economy and caused massive environmental 
damage. Oil earnings also tended to mask the Soviet Union’s increasingly 
severe economic problems, and by giving the illusion of continued viability to 
a system that was already in serious trouble reduced incentives for undertaking 
sorely needed structural reforms.35 
Finally, the oil crises, by providing the producing countries with extra reve-
nues and the confidence to assert their prerogatives led to a massive buy-out of 
the international oil companies and the establishment of national oil companies. 
Although the producing countries already owned their oil reserves, as of 1971 
the international oil companies still possessed concessions that allowed them to 
control the production and distribution of the oil.36 In the late 1960s, OPEC 
declared that its members should participate in the ownership and control of 
their respective oil industries, and it called for a gradual and compensated 
takeover of the oil facilities in their countries. In 1970, national oil companies 
owned less than 10 percent of their oil industries, but by the end of the decade, 
                                                             
34  Smith 1993, 88-96. The total sales figures were higher, but many of the countries did not 
pay their bills, resulting in a lower net gain. 
35  Gustafson 1989; Allen 2001; see also the contribution in this HSR Special Issue by Perović and 
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lowing the 1953 coup effectively returned control to the international oil companies; see Painter 
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the figure was 68 percent. Ownership of all aspects of their oil industries gave 
producing countries greater control over such factors as the pace of develop-
ment of their reserves, the rate of production, and the destination of exports.37 
5.  From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine 
The first oil shock highlighted the West’s dependence on Middle East oil. 
Efforts to build up Iran to take over Great Britain’s role as “guardian of the 
Gulf” also demonstrated the interaction of the Cold War with concerns about 
regional instability and Western access to Middle East oil. In addition, con-
servative critics of détente sought to frame the October War 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War as an attempt by the Soviets to expand their influence in the Middle East, 
clearly connecting regional instability and oil with the Cold War.38  
In mid-1969, the Nixon administration announced that the United States 
would in the future refrain from sending U.S. troops to help countries facing 
internal subversion but rather would provide them with “assistance in helping 
them solve their own problems.” Initially intended to reassure its Asian allies 
that the United States would not abandon them while convincing the American 
public and European allies that the United States would avoid future Vietnams, 
Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger gradually expanded 
the president’s “informal and ambiguous” remarks into a more comprehensive 
statement of policy that became known as the Nixon Doctrine.39 
Despite its origins in Nixon’s Vietnam strategy, the Nixon Doctrine had a 
profound impact on U.S. policy in the Middle East. In early 1968, the British 
informed the United States of their decision to withdraw their remaining mili-
tary forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. Embroiled in an unpopu-
lar war in Vietnam, the United States turned to Iran to take over as guardian of 
the gulf. The shah was eager to accept, hoping to restore the power and prestige 
of ancient Persia. Ignoring warnings from the U.S. military mission in Iran the 
Nixon administration in mid-1972 decided to give the shah a “blank check” to 
buy any U.S. weapons system short of nuclear weapons. For the other pillar of 
its policy, the United States looked to Saudi Arabia, which eventually took on 
the former U.S. role of maintaining spare production capacity that could be 
used supply oil in an emergency and help moderate prices.40  
The regional surrogate strategy was just underway when the 1973-74 
OAPEC embargo and production cutbacks led to a quadrupling of oil prices. 
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While high oil prices caused economic problems for oil importing countries, 
there were political benefits. Higher prices allowed Iran to increase its military 
spending and replace Great Britain as the “guardian of the gulf.” Increased 
revenues also allowed Saudi Arabia to continue its financial support to Egypt to 
help Sadat reduce his ties with the Soviet Union and reorient Egypt’s internal 
politics away from Nasserism and Arab socialism.41 
Between 1970 and 1978, the United States sold Iran over $20 billion worth 
of military equipment and training.42 The massive influx of oil money resulted 
in extravagant military spending, inflation, massive rural-urban migration, and 
increases in already sharp inequalities in wealth and income. The weapons sys-
tems the shah bought also brought thousands of Western technicians and military 
advisers into Iran, further inflaming conservative fears of corrosive Western 
influence and swelling the ranks of the shah’s opponents. By 1977, Iran’s ex-
penditures were outrunning its revenues, and rapid, but uneven, economic growth 
and wrenching social change increased discontent with the shah’s regime.43  
Shortly after President Jimmy Carter visited Iran in December 1977 and 
praised the shah for making Iran “an island of stability in one of the more trou-
bled areas of the world,” widespread demonstrations against the regime broke 
out.44 The unrest escalated during the year, but Carter and his top officials, 
preoccupied with other important issues including the SALT II treaty, negotia-
tions with China, the Camp David negotiations, and the onset of revolution in 
Nicaragua, paid little attention until fall 1978.45 
Concerns about Western vulnerabilities in the Middle East had existed since 
the onset of the Carter administration. In its first comprehensive assessment of 
the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, administration analysts had identified the 
Persian Gulf as a vital and vulnerable region and had singled out Iran as a 
potential trouble spot. In addition, Carter’s hawkish national security adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski was concerned that Soviet and Cuban involvement in the 
Horn of Africa, astride the maritime routes to and from the Persian Gulf, could 
threaten Western access to the region’s oil.46  
With these concerns in mind, Brzezinski lobbied for military intervention in 
Iran, either by the shah’s forces or by the United States. In early December 
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1978, he warned Carter that the United States was confronting the beginning of 
a major crisis, similar to what Europe experienced in the late 1940s, in an “arc 
of crisis” stretching from Bangladesh to Aden. Brzezinski was especially con-
cerned about Iran. At the end of December he warned: “the disintegration of 
Iran, with Iran repeating the experience of Afghanistan would be the most 
massive American defeat since the beginning of the Cold War, overshadowing 
in its real consequences the setback in Vietnam.”47 Unable to convince the shah 
to crush the revolt with military force or to organize a military coup to save his 
regime, the United States gave up on the shah, who fled Iran on 16 January 
1979.48 Despite hopes that the military would rally behind the caretaker gov-
ernment left by the shah, the military and the government soon collapsed, and 
power passed to a coalition of opposition forces including supporters of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini who returned to Iran from exile in February.49 
The Iranian Revolution disrupted oil supplies and markets. Iranian exports 
briefly stopped in November 1978 and again in early 1979, before resuming 
later in that year at a reduced level. Although increases in production in other 
countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, partly offset the drop in Iranian exports, 
fear of spreading turmoil, the disruption of marketing channels, and a build-up 
of inventories due to fear of further problems resulted in 10 percent drop in the 
amount of oil available in international markets. Oil prices doubled from a 
posted price of $14.08 a barrel in 1978 to $31.61 in 1979, and reached $36.83 
(in nominal dollars) in 1980 as the Saudis began to cut back their production.50  
The fall of the shah convinced U.S. policymakers that the previous policy of 
reliance on regional surrogates to guard Western interests in the Middle East 
was no longer viable.51 Reports about an impending oil shortage in the Soviet 
Union further fed fears of Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf. In 1977, three 
CIA studies had predicted that Soviet oil production would peak in 1980 and 
decline sharply thereafter, forcing the Soviet Union and its East European allies 
to look outside the Soviet bloc to meet their oil needs. After being mentioned in 
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connection with President Jimmy Carter’s energy plan, some of the studies 
were made public.52 Although independent experts raised doubts about these 
predictions, and the CIA backed away from the reports, the belief that the So-
viets wanted to gain control of Persian Gulf oil persisted. So far, scholars have 
found no convincing evidence that Soviet involvement in the so-called arc of 
crisis was driven by a desire to gain access to the oil resources of the Persian 
Gulf or to deny the West access to these resources.53  
After looking at the impact of the fall of the shah, Soviet activities in Af-
ghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen, and increasing U.S. dependence on 
oil imports, Carter’s national security advisers concluded “the United States 
has vital interests in the Middle East area and the Soviet Union, by comparison, 
does not.” To guard those interests, the United States should improve its “mili-
tary surge capabilities” and establish a permanent military presence in the 
region. The U.S. objective should not be an equal military balance with the 
Soviet forces in the region, but rather “a perceptible military preponderance.”54 
At the Vienna Summit in June 1979, Carter told Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev that there were some areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf and 
the Arabian Peninsula, where the United States and its allies had “absolutely 
vital interests.” In such areas it was essential that the Soviets exercise restraint 
in order not to threaten U.S. national security interests. Brezhnev told Carter 
not to blame the Soviet Union for the changes taking place in the world, and he 
denied that the Soviet Union was trying to gain control of countries in “the so-
called arc of crisis.” The whole idea, he countered, was a “complete fairy tale.” 
Brezhnev also complained about the casual way in which the United States 
claimed that remote corners of the world were vital interests.55 
Shortly after the Vienna Summit, the United States began assisting forces 
fighting the communist-led government of Afghanistan, which had seized power 
in an April 1978 coup. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan were already aiding the 
anti-government forces in Afghanistan. Brzezinski later boasted that this aid was 
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intended to provoke the Soviets into sending troops into Afghanistan, revealing 
their “true” nature and getting them bogged down in a Vietnam-like quagmire.56 
The storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical supporters of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979 and the taking of 52 U.S. hostages 
intensified U.S. concerns about Iran. The CIA feared that instability in Iran could 
give way to a leftist regime more favorable to the Soviets. Even if Ayatollah 
Khomeini was able to restore order, which the CIA assessed as unlikely, “it may 
only be the precursor to more determined efforts to export the revolution.”57  
Shi’a protests in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the takeover of 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca by militants in November 1979s further stoked 
fears of spreading unrest. The Shi’a protests were only in part inspired by Iran, 
and initial fears that Iran was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque proved 
to be unfounded. Nevertheless, coming so soon after the Iranian Revolution, 
these events heightened concerns about regional instability and access to oil.58 
The United States was considering military action against Iran when Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979 seemed to confirm fears 
that the Soviets would take advantage of regional turmoil to advance their 
interests. Brzezinski wrote Carter the next day that the United States was facing 
a crisis, with both Iran and Afghanistan in turmoil, and Pakistan “both unstable 
internally and extremely apprehensive externally.” If the Soviets succeeded in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan acquiesced, “the age-long dream of Moscow to have 
direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled.”59 
The CIA, on the other hand, did not believe that Soviet intervention in Af-
ghanistan constituted the “beginning of a premeditated strategic offensive.” 
Rather the CIA assessed the intervention as a reluctant response to what Soviet 
leaders feared was the “imminent and otherwise irreversible deterioration” of 
their position in a neighboring country. While noting that the Soviets would 
probably try to take advantage of the situation in Iran, the CIA did not believe 
that the Soviet move in Afghanistan presaged action against Iran. Subsequent 
research supports the CIA analysis..60 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led the United States to shelve plans to 
take military action against Iran. According to Brzezinski, actions against Iran 
had to be weighed against their impact on the larger goal of containing Soviet 
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ambitions. In particular, Brzezinski believed that in order to mobilize Islamic 
opposition to the Soviets, the United States had to avoid a military confrontation 
with Iran.61 
Following NSC discussions of measures the United States could take to re-
spond to Soviet actions, Brzezinski recommended that the United States alter 
its policy on selling arms to China and fashion deeper security arrangements for 
the Middle East. Otherwise, Soviet influence could spread rapidly from Afghani-
stan to Pakistan and Iran, which “would place in direct jeopardy our most vital 
interests in the Middle East.” Brzezinski repeated these themes in an interview 
published in the Wall Street Journal, stressing that the fates of Western Europe, 
East Asia, and the United States were linked to the Persian Gulf and its oil.62 
Carter agreed with his national security adviser, and in his State of the Un-
ion address on January 23, 1980, warned that the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan “could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World 
War.” The Persian Gulf contained more than two-thirds of the world’s exporta-
ble oil, and Soviet control of Afghanistan would put Soviet military forces 
within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, 
through which most of the region’s oil flowed. The Soviets, he concluded, were 
“attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave 
threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.” To meet this threat the Presi-
dent announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine: “An attempt by 
any outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” 63  
Carter also stated that the United States would improve its capability to de-
ploy military forces rapidly in the region. In March, the Defense Department 
established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force at MacDill Air Force Base in 
Florida. The United States also began negotiations to secure access to facilities 
in the region and made preparations to preposition equipment on land and on 
special ships.64 
In one of its last official acts, the Carter administration in January 1981 elevat-
ed the status of the Persian Gulf in terms of U.S. strategic priorities. According to 
the NSC, Western Europe, especially after NATO’s decision in December 1979 
to modernize its theater nuclear forces, was more secure, and the development of 
a strategic partnership with the PRC had improved the strategic balance in East 
Asia. In contrast, U.S. ability to defend Western interests in the Persian Gulf 
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region needed to be improved, and this required a greater allocation of U.S. re-
sources to the defense of the region. In a pair of Presidential Directives signed on 
15 January 1981, the Carter administration assigned the Persian Gulf region top 
priority for resources in the Five Year Defense Plan and second place, after 
Western Europe, in terms of planning for wartime operations.65 
6.  Aftermath of the Oil Crises 
At first glance, it appears that the oil crises of the 1970s hurt the United States 
and its allies and strengthened the Soviet Union. In longer perspective, howev-
er, a different story emerges. Over time, higher oil prices led to increases in oil 
supply, decreases in demand, and a drastic drop in oil prices. These changes in 
the world oil economy played an important role in the end of the Cold War. 
After the first oil shock in 1973-74, the OECD nations launched a coordinated 
campaign to protect themselves from future disruptions in supply. The campaign 
focused on reducing oil consumption through greater efficiency and conservation, 
replacing oil with other energy sources, particularly in electricity generation, and 
reducing oil imports from OPEC producers, especially those in the Middle East, 
by increasing oil production elsewhere. Although these efforts lagged due to 
declining real prices for oil between 1974 and 1979, the second oil shock re-
vived them. Between 1979 and 1985, oil consumption in the non-communist 
world fell from 51.6 to 46.3 million bpd as a result of higher prices and reces-
sions in 1973-1975 and 1979-1982. In addition, coal and natural gas replaced fuel 
oil in many industrial and utility uses, and total use of nuclear power by the ad-
vanced industrial countries more than doubled. Over the same period, non-OPEC 
oil production, mainly in Great Britain, Norway, Mexico, and the United States, 
increased from 17.7 to 22.6 million barrels per day, as higher prices and advances 
in technology, especially in offshore production, spurred increased output. The 
result was a 10.2 million bpd drop in demand for OPEC oil.66 
Despite the disruption caused by the Iran-Iraq War, these changes in supply 
and demand began to affect oil prices. After initially trying to support prices by 
reducing output, the Saudi leadership decided in the summer of 1985 to regain 
their position in world markets by increasing production. Rather than selling oil 
at a fixed price, the price would be based on what refined products sold for in the 
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marketplace minus a fixed margin for the refiner. The new system put a premium 
on volume rather than price and led to a collapse of world oil prices in 1986.67 
The price collapse decimated Soviet hard currency earnings and undermined 
the reform plans of the new Soviet government of Mikhail Gorbachev, who had 
come to power in March 1985. Gorbachev hoped to use oil earnings to finance 
a modernization of Soviet industry and to improve living standards, thus easing 
the transition from a command economy to a market economy and a more 
democratic society. Instead, declining oil prices played an important role in the 
collapse of the Soviet economy, the end of the Cold War, and the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union.68 
Some conservative writers claim that the Reagan administration engineered 
the oil price collapse to bring about the fall of communism and win the Cold 
War. Even if this is what happened – and it is far from clear on the basis of the 
available record – they miss a key point: Gorbachev and the generation of 
Soviet leaders that emerged in the 1980s had already concluded that continued 
conflict with the West threatened their goal of overcoming the disastrous lega-
cy of Stalinism, reforming their economy, democratizing their politics, and 
revitalizing their society. Thus rather than killing communism, which was 
already terminally ill, the collapse of oil prices precluded the possibility of 
social democracy in the Soviet Union.69 
7.  Conclusion 
Oil was an important source of U.S. power and influence in the twentieth cen-
tury. During the Cold War, U.S. policy focused on containing the Soviet Un-
ion, ending destructive political, economic, and military competition among the 
core capitalist states, mitigating class conflict within the capitalist core by 
promoting economic growth, and retaining access to the raw materials, mar-
kets, and labor of the periphery in an era of decolonization and national libera-
tion. Control of oil was central to these efforts.70 
The oil crises of the 1970s threatened U.S. control of world oil and thus U.S. 
dominance in the international system. U.S. oil production peaked in 1970s, 
making the United States increasingly dependent on oil imports and ending its 
ability to provide oil to its allies during supply interruptions, a capacity that had 
been an important source of U.S. influence. At the same time, economic na-
tionalism, war and revolution in the Middle East, and the changing dynamics of 
the Cold War raised questions about the ability of the United States to maintain 
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access to Middle East oil. Oil prices rose steeply in 1973-74 and again in 1978-
80, causing serious economic problems for the United States and its allies. In 
addition to the economic impact, the realization that access to oil at low prices 
was threatened undermined confidence in Western dominance. To make mat-
ters worse, the Soviet Union overtook the United States as the leading oil pro-
ducer, and the windfall from higher prices allowed the Soviets to import large 
amounts of Western grain and machinery, giving the illusion of continued 
viability to a system that was already in serious trouble. Higher oil revenues 
also indirectly helped finance Soviet military power and involvement in the 
Third World. Although the oil crises of 1970s undermined U.S. control of 
world oil, they also set in motion changes that led to a reassertion of U.S. pow-
er and the end of the Cold War. 
The oil crises of the 1970s were so intimately intertwined with the dynamics 
of the Cold War that it is impossible understand the history of the Cold War 
without taking oil into account. The history of oil does tell not the whole story, 
but accounts that neglect its role are incomplete, and therefore misleading. 
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